

Antiphilosophy, Philosophy, and Love: Reading of “Tony Takitani” by Murakami Haruki*

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Abstract

According to Badiou, the history of Western thought is constituted by a ceaseless dialogue between philosophy and antiphilosophy. In this article, I examine how love can be addressed in terms of the dialogue between Lacanian antiphilosophy and Badiouian philosophy. To this end, I present a reading of “Tony Takitani” by Japanese writer Murakami Haruki as subject matter to facilitate that dialogue. From the perspective of this article, it is crucial to hold onto both the psychoanalytic and philosophical readings of the story. Through the former, we can recognize that love is involved in the symptomatic real and that the lover is supposed to assume the position of a quasi-analyst to work through the symptom. Through the latter, we can consider that love should pass through the symptomatic real to construct the infinite truth and that love is a way to metaphysical happiness beyond animalistic satisfaction. Love thus belongs neither to philosophy nor to antiphilosophy but instead straddles the two disciplines. In this regard, “Tony Takitani” makes the dialogue between philosophy and antiphilosophy inconclusive.

Keywords

love, philosophy, antiphilosophy, Murakami Haruki, “Tony Takitani”

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Introduction: A Dialogue between Antiphilosophy and Philosophy about Love

According to Badiou, the history of Western thought is constituted by the incessant controversy between philosophy and antiphilosophy; Parmenides's being as the One against Heraclitus's flux; Greek Philosophers' logos against St. Paul's mythos of resurrection; Pascal's grace against Descartes's reason; Rousseau's sentiment against the Encyclopedists' judgment; Kierkegaard's singularity against Hegel's absolute knowledge; Nietzsche's life against Plato's Idea; Wittgenstein's absence of metalanguage against Russell's theory of types; and finally, Lacan against Althusser.¹ The relationship between philosophy and antiphilosophy is complex. After all, antiphilosophy is a philosophy, and unlike the distant relationship between philosophy and sophistry, philosophy and antiphilosophy are near in kinship. They are like two different species of the same genus. Unlike sophistry, which totally denies truth, antiphilosophy accepts the category of truth, albeit in its own unique way. Moreover, both mobilize some kind of operation or act, albeit in different ways. So who is an antiphilosopher?² In *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy*, Badiou writes that an antiphilosopher "awakes" a philosopher with regard to the point that philosophy invents new concepts in and against the contemporary situation (67). An antiphilosopher enlightens a philosopher with the untimely contemporaneity of truths. In "Who Is Nietzsche?", Badiou also states that antiphilosophy previews the figure of a philosophy to come: "antiphilosophy is always what, at its very extremes, states the new duty of philosophy, or its new possibility in the figure of a new duty. I think of Nietzsche's madness, of Wittgenstein's strange labyrinth, of Lacan's final muteness. In all three cases antiphilosophy takes the form of a legacy. It bequeaths something beyond itself to the very thing that it is fighting against. Philosophy is always the heir to antiphilosophy" (10). Badiouian philosophy is an heir to Lacanian antiphilosophy. The ideas about mathematics as the science of the real, love as addressed to

¹ I expanded the list a little bit, building on Badiou's list in *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy* (69). From now on, citations from Badiou's works will be abbreviated as follows: *Wittgenstein's Antiphilosophy* as WA; *Theoretical Writings* as TW; *Conditions* as C; *Logics of Worlds* as LW; *Lacan: L'antiphilosophie 3* as LL3; *Métaphysique du bonheur réel* as MBR.

² There is no global definition of antiphilosophy because an antiphilosopher invents his/her own category against the targeted dominant philosophy. Nevertheless, we can tentatively define an antiphilosopher as someone who awakens philosophy with his/her irreducible life, unrepresentable body, exceptional existence, untheorizable act to go beyond abstract ideas, theoretical discourses, and totalizing systems in philosophy.

weakness, and politics as pertaining to the unsuturable hole are affirmed, developed, and refined in Badiou's year-long seminar on Lacan. In accordance with his own principle that any contemporary philosophy worthy of the name must work through Lacan, it is Badiou who recasts philosophy by accepting the challenge of Lacanian antiphilosophy (*TW* 119).

In this regard, the relationship between philosophy and antiphilosophy is not a matter of formal opposition but rather of dynamic dialogue. Here, it is worth referring to what Badiou calls the ethics of philosophy in relation to sophistry. Philosophy runs into a disaster of thought when "it presents itself as being not a seizing of truths but a *situation of truth*" (*C* 15; emphasis in original). A disaster arrives when philosophy forgets its task of seizing truths with the empty category of truth but rather pretends to produce truths. In pretending to produce truths, philosophy appeals to an ecstatic place (philosophy is the only place to get access to truth), a sacred name (as in Plato's idea of the Good as the ultimate instance of Truth of truths), and an injunctive terror (anything that does not fit into truth as presence ought not be), all of which comes down to the degeneration of philosophy. Therefore, while philosophy should not yield to sophistry, it nevertheless should not exterminate sophistry as the partner of dialogue. The same is also true of the relationship between philosophy and antiphilosophy. Philosophy should overcome the temptation to put an end to the controversy with antiphilosophy. Philosophy should be willing to be alerted and awakened by antiphilosophy, learning from antiphilosophy and accepting its challenge to reinvent itself. In sum, the relationship between philosophy and antiphilosophy is a matter of an agonistic dialogue.

The purpose of this article is to think of love through Lacanian antiphilosophy and Badiouian philosophy. To this end, I will refer to the contemporary Japanese writer Murakami Haruki's "Tony Takitani" as the singular case of love that facilitates a dialogue between antiphilosophy and philosophy. Murakami Haruki's "Tony Takitani" narrates the life and the love of a man named Tony Takitani. Due to his unusual name, which reminds some Japanese people of the old wounds of the American occupation of Japan, Tony has a solitary childhood. However, he becomes a professional illustrator, using a realistic technique with mechanical precision. He loves his work and spends every minute on work, shut up in his room. Solitude is habitual for Tony. Then, he falls in love with a girl. Although she is not exceptionally beautiful, the way she dresses makes a deep impression on Tony. For the first time in his life, he feels the weight and agony of solitude. Tony proposes to her, and they get married. The couple's married life goes smoothly, except for one

thing about her. In the presence of fancy clothes, she cannot resist her compulsive buying, which leads her to fill an entire room with new clothes. One day, oscillating between her irresistible symptom and the resistance against her symptom, she is killed in a car accident. As a way of overcoming her death, Tony hires a female assistant who can wear his wife's dresses, but he finally tells the woman to forget about the job, accepting that it is all over. His life returns to a state of solitude. At this point, the question arises: Why this story? What does the relationship between antiphilosophy and philosophy have to do with this short story?

In "History, Adaptation, Japan: Haruki Murakami's 'Tony Takitani' and Jun Ichikawa's Tony Takitani," Barbara Thornbury focuses on socio-historical issues, such as consumption and disconnection, that anticipated Japan's economic bubble in the early 1990s. The take of this article is different. Reading "Tony Takitani" as a love story, this article provides an analysis of how the beloved's symptoms drive love into the corner and of how the lover is supposed to act toward the beloved's subjective change. This amounts to the psychoanalytic reading of the story. At the same time, this article focuses on the critique of love being limited by the symptoms and the prescription of the principle of love, supported by metaphysical happiness. This amounts to the philosophical reading of the story. In this regard, "Tony Takitani" emerges as a useful case to organize a dialogue between antiphilosophy and philosophy in that it allows for both readings. I hope that analyzing how the two disciplines can read the same story from different perspectives will enhance our insights about the complexity of love. The first issue of the dialogue is concerned with the real and truth, and the second issue is concerned with analytic acts and philosophical operations.³ Let us begin with the first.

Between the Symptomatic Real and the Amorous Truth

While late Lacan links the real to many terms such as *jouissance*, sexual non-relationship, feminine not-all, and ex-sistence, this article notes that the symptom is the most crucial instance of the real. This point can be supported on two grounds. First, one can locate the link between the symptom and other instances of the real. Already, in *Seminar X*, the link between the symptom and *jouissance* (as the destructive force of the drive beyond the pleasure principle) is evoked in that the symptom is defined as a self-sufficient *jouissance* that does not call for an

³ This implies that our discussion supposes that antiphilosophy is constituted by the real and analytic acts, and philosophy is constituted by truth and philosophical operations.

interpretation and does not address the symbolic Other. “[T]he symptom is not, like acting-out, which calls upon interpretation, because . . . what analysis uncovers in the symptom is that the symptom is not an appeal to the Other, it is not what shows itself to the Other. The symptom, in its nature, is *jouissance* . . .” (“[L]e symptôme n’est pas comme l’*acting-out*, appelant l’interprétation, car, . . . ce que l’analyse découvre dans le symptôme, c’est que le symptôme n’est pas appel à l’Autre, n’est pas ce qui montre à l’Autre. Le symptôme, dans sa nature, est *jouissance* . . .”) (SX 125).⁴ The link between sexual non-relationship and symptom is also affirmed in that sexual non-relationship triggers the formation of the symptom. “I went into medicine because I suspected that relations between man and woman played a decisive role in the symptoms of human beings” (“Je suis venu à la médecine parce que j’avais le soupçon que les relations entre homme et femme jouaient un rôle déterminant dans les symptômes des êtres humains.”) (Lacan, “Conférences” 16). Second, late Lacan elaborates a more direct and stereographic link between the real itself and the symptom. “I call the symptom that which comes from the real” (“J’appelle ‘symptôme’ ce qui vient du réel.”) (Lacan, *La Troisième* n. pag.). The political overtone of the symptomatic real is evoked. “As analyst, I can only take the strike to be a symptom . . . in the sense that the symptom belongs to the real” (SXXII 11/19/1974). The symptom constitutes the kernel of the subjective real. “The symptom is the most real thing that many people have” (Lacan, “Yale” 7). The symptom as the manifestation of the real shows that human beings are sick animals. The symptom “is the way the real manifests itself at our level as living beings. As living beings, we are eaten away at, bitten by the symptom” (Lacan, *Triumph of Religion* 77).⁵ If analysts accomplish what scientists are unable to do, it is because “they are confronted with the real far more than even scientists are,” because they explore the real as “what does not work,” contrary to the world as “what works” (TR 61-62). Finally, the clinical significance of the symptom cannot be overemphasized, insofar as what is at stake in analytic work is to assist the analysand to know more about his/her symptomatic real. “The analysis consists in realizing why one has these symptoms” (SXXV 1/10/1978).⁶

⁴ From now on, Lacan’s seminars are abbreviated as *S*, followed by the Roman numeral of the volume number. For those seminars that are not published, the dates of the seminar sessions (month/day/year) are listed in place of page numbers.

⁵ Hereafter abbreviated as *TR*.

⁶ Let us quote two more instances to show the significance of the symptom as a possible anchoring point for late Lacan. First, the symptom is conceived of as something that straddles both the truth and the real. “The truth, this is what psychoanalysis teaches us, lies at the point where the subject refuses to know. Everything that is rejected from the symbolic reappears in the

The importance of the symptom lies not only in its connection to the real but also in its antiphilosophical implication. For Lacan, the reason psychoanalysis is antiphilosophical is not merely because psychoanalysis pits the real against being or acts against thought but because the existence of psychoanalysis itself constitutes a symptom that challenges philosophy. “I define it [psychoanalysis] as a symptom—something that reveals the malaise of the society in which we live. Of course, it is not a philosophy. I abhor philosophy” (qtd. in Skinner n. pag.). Psychoanalysis can shed light on what philosophy loses sight of, for it is a practice of symptomatology that reveals the malaise of society. Unlike the philosophical reduction of social pathology into abstract ideas, psychoanalysis exposes social pathology inscribed within the psychic reality of a specific subject in an irreducible way. If philosophy sutures the gap of the symptom, psychoanalysis comes to terms with it. The symptom is a key component to render psychoanalysis antiphilosophical. In this regard, the symptom as the instance of the real can serve as a useful tool to explore the antiphilosophical aspect of love.

For Lacan, there is no sexual relationship between man and woman. Instead, there is a relationship between masculine perversion and feminine psychosis, apart from one’s biological sex. While the masculine position reduces the Other to the object of his desire for the recuperation of his lost *jouissance*, the feminine position elevates the Other into an ideal symbol that causes devastating *jouissance*. In both cases, one is addressed to the Other that is filtered and captured by one’s symptom, not the Other sex. Instead of a sexual relation, there is a relation between two symptoms. One can recognize a dramatic unfolding of this logic in “Tony Takitani.” There is no sexual relation between Tony and his wife. Instead, there is a symptomatic relation between solitude and addiction. Their love is constituted by an inter-symptomatic relation. Their love draws the attention of the analyst because it is involved in and constituted by each one’s symptomatic real.

Love has a unique relationship with the symptom. On the one hand, the symptom poses an impenetrable enigma to love. In the case of the shopping addiction of Tony’s wife, Tony is not concerned about the amount of money that she spends. For him, her desire for clothing and the satisfaction she obtains from shopping appears eccentric and incomprehensible. Witnessing her “opaque *jouissance* that excludes any meaning,” the situation of Tony is similar to that of the “post-Joycean” analyst who faces Joyce’s tongue twisters in *lalangue* as the

real. This is the key to what is called the symptom. The symptom is this real knot where the truth of the subject lies” (*SXV* 6/19/1968). Secondly, the symptom is directly equated with “psychic reality as a whole” (*SXXIII* 147).

senseless materiality of a baby-like babbling (Lacan, “Joyce” 36). The symptom thus sets up an invisible wall between lovers. The symptom renders the beloved foreign and monstrous. The symptom puts love to the test of unfathomable otherness. Unable to plumb the Other with the idiosyncratic subjective real, Tony asks her, “do you really need so many expensive dresses?” (Murakami 196). The symptom places a limit on love. Although she loves Tony, when she returns her coat to the clothing shop and jumps behind the wheel, all she can think about is the coat. One cannot simply assert that her love for Tony is inauthentic and her love for clothes is authentic. Rather, her addiction blurs the distinction between authentic and inauthentic love. Her addiction, which is both most intimate and most foreign even to herself, renders her love precarious and obscure.

On the other hand, love brings one’s symptom to the fore. Love offers us a chance to engage with the symptom, which has been denied, repressed, and foreclosed until now. Since childhood, Tony’s life has been filled with solitude. What is notable is that his solitude was seldom problematic to him. He isolated himself from the world, indulging in his work. It was only by falling in love that he came to confront his subjective real of solitude. It is his love that makes his solitude, which has been invisible, visible. Here, Tony confesses to his wife “how lonely his life had been until then, how much he had lost over the years, how she had made him realize all that” (Murakami 193). As Lacan puts it, if love is to give what one does not have, what she gave him was his own solitude. Her amorous gift was to let him witness the real of his life. Love is the revelation of lack and loss associated with the symptom that has been unrevealed prior to love. In this regard, the psychoanalytic conception of love is not the same as moralists’ or sophists’ conception that love does not exist at all, or that love is nothing but an illusion. While it is the case that the symptom constitutes love, it is only love that reveals the unrevealed subjective real. Lacan’s following interrogation is thus legitimate: “Are you aware how rare it is for love to come to grief on the real qualities or faults of the loved one?” (*SII* 218) Of course, love comes to grief in the majority of cases. What matters is *how* love comes to grief. Tony had been involved with several women before. However, involvement is different from love. Before meeting his wife, Tony did not have to realize his solitude, for involvement did not allow him to confront his subjective real. It is only falling in love with her that destabilizes his stable life and forces him to confront his subjective real. While involvements are common in the world, love that comes to grief or comes to grips with the symptomatic real is rare. To rephrase Spinoza in his *Ethics*, love at the level of the symptom is as difficult as it is rare. It is difficult because the symptom poses an

aporia to love, and it is rare because the symptom authorizes the exceptional manifestation of the subjective real. In sum, psychoanalysis as antiphilosophy clarifies an intricate relationship between love and the symptom. While love is put to the test of the symptomatic real, love also serves as a rare occasion to reveal the subjective real in the form of the symptom.

To this, Badiouian philosophy responds that there is a rarer kind of love, love that creates a truth through and beyond the real. On the one hand, Badiou accepts that love is not of the imaginary, but of the real. This can be verified in the various concepts that he uses, such as the amorous process as a “limping march” rather than a harmonious unity,⁷ sexual disjunction as the ontological ground of love, the point as the test of the real, and jouissance as the “unnamable” of the amorous truth.⁸ However, on the other hand, this is not enough for a philosophical vision of love for Badiou. The significance of the limping march as the amorous process does not lie in revealing the real but in creating an amorous infinity. The necessity of sexual disjunction is accepted only insofar as sexual disjunction does not preexist but is provoked by an amorous encounter in the form of an unpredictable event. Finally, late Badiou rejects the notion of the unnamable as the mark of finitude, and jouissance is often equated with the mark of the power of death. Lacan, for his part, occasionally equates the truth with the symptom. “The truth is manifested in an enigmatic fashion in the symptom. Which is what? A subjective opaqueness” (*SXIV* 2/22/1967). Against this, Badiou would maintain a rigorous distinction between the truth and the symptom, which provokes a critical engagement with love in “Tony Takitani.”

Badiouian love or amorous truth presents a consistent principle of love. Love begins with an encounter, persists through fidelity, and constructs an infinity. From this Badiouian principle, love in “Tony Takitani” does not measure up to an amorous truth. Tony’s love was instituted by an eventual encounter that ruptures the law of his self-sufficient world organized around solitude. However, their love came to a halt because they could not successfully pass through the test of his wife’s symptomatic real. Their amorous sequence was launched but then suspended. Their love attests to the power of an amorous encounter, but it does not attain a persistent amorous process that elaborates the power of an encounter. To refer to Badiou’s critique of contemporary love without any risk, their love was more of a risk-taking wager than a secured insurance. Tony decided to be with her by

⁷ See Badiou’s “The Scene of Two.”

⁸ The unnamable in love implies that it is impossible to name the sexual real of jouissance even through the amorous language of lovers. See Badiou’s *Ethics*, pp. 80-87.

breaking out of his stabilized isolation. She accepted Tony's proposal, leaving behind her worry about the fifteen-year difference in age. The etymology of the symptom tells us that the symptom comes from what happens (*sumpiptein*). There was indeed some "happening" in their love. However, this happening was not expanded through ongoing fidelity. Their love definitely reached the level of *syn*, together, but not the level of the Two. They were together, but failed to organize the scene of the Two. Their love passed through the level of *pipto*, fall, not only in the sense of the amorous fall, but also in the sense of the revelation of their respective symptoms. However, they failed to construct an amorous infinity by elaborating the consequences of the fall. Their love was limited to falling in love and revealing the way each relates to the subjective real. The symptomatic love failed to create an amorous truth.

Notably, this philosophical critique of symptomatic love depends on the notion of life, concerning which psychoanalysis and philosophy are at odds in a global way. In the lecture at the Catholic University of Louvain in 1972, Lacan states, "You're right to believe you will die. It sustains you. If you didn't believe it, could you bear the life that you have?" ("Vous avez bien raison de croire que vous allez mourir bien sûr; ça vous soutient. Si vous n'y croyez pas, est-ce que vous pourriez supporter la vie que vous avez?").⁹ Psychoanalysis notes that life is a painstaking struggle with unbearable *jouissance*. During their date, Tony's wife tells Tony that most of her pay goes toward clothing. For her, the desire for new clothing is irresistible. The fantasy of satisfying this insatiable desire structures her life, and the intensive and transitory drive at the moment of buying clothing orients it. The impasse of desire and the prison of *jouissance* situate her life between Scylla and Charybdis. Her life becomes livable with the satisfaction of compulsive buying, and it becomes worthless with its frustration. In Badiou's words, her life renounces the possibility of becoming a subject of truth. Her life becomes a matter of the human animal's body that oscillates between the life drive (*Eros*) and the death drive (*Thanatos*). Against this vision of life, Badiou articulates that "life is the wager, made on a body that has entered into appearing, that one will faithfully entrust this body with a new temporality, keeping at a distance the conservative drive as well as the mortifying drive. Life is what gets the better of the drives" (*LW* 509). The true life can be attained only when the power of the drive is held in check and the animal body is reborn with the subjective body of truth. A life that is determined and ruled by drives amounts to either the *mors vitalis* or *vita mortalis* of the un-

⁹ See Jacques Lacan, "Conférence de Louvain suivie d'un entretien avec Françoise Wolff" (13 Oct. 1972). The English translation is transcribed from an online video, "Lacan on Death, Faith."

dead. In this regard, the symptomatic love covers up the possibility of the true life of the subjectivizable body with the fact of the survival/death of the animalistic body.

The essence of the true life is happiness. Following the Aristotelian distinction between pleasure (*hedonia*) and happiness (*eudaimonia*), Badiou makes a distinction between satisfaction and happiness. Whereas satisfaction belongs to the individual who conforms to the dominating law of the world, happiness belongs to the becoming subject of the individual through the rupture of the law. With satisfaction, the individual enjoys only that for which his/her preexisting existence provides in a finite way. With happiness, the subject enjoys that which recreates his/her existence in an unprecedented and infinite way. In Tony's case, although he glances at the entry to happiness through the subversion of his way of living and loving, he does not reach an amorous infinity. This can be seen in the fact that, after his wife's death, Tony hires a female assistant and has her wear his wife's clothing. This seemingly effective strategy of mourning, however, misses the crucial point that true mourning lies in living with the loss of an irreplaceable singularity, not in compensating for the loss with a random particularity, i.e., any female body with the same dress size as his wife's. It also misses the point that as long as love is infinite, handling the loss of love is also a matter of an infinite subjectivization of the loss, not of a facile substitution for the loss. His mourning thus fails to become a subjective assumption of loss but remains an objective and/or imaginary replacement of loss. This is probably why he cannot recall his wife's face, while the image of the temporarily hired woman ironically persists in his memory: "Long after he had forgotten all kinds of things, including the woman's name, her image remained strangely unforgettable" (Murakami 202). Contrary to the Badiouian subject who affirms even the amorous loss as a part of an amorous infinity based on the conviction that the traumatic loss cannot outstrip the amorous happiness, the mark of finitude ends up provoking and orienting Tony's love, with clothing serving as a particular object. To use Badiou's distinction in his unpublished seminar, clothing serves as "waste (*déchet*)," a finite object stuck onto itself, rather than "work (*œuvre*)," a finite material that nevertheless opens onto an infinite amorous process.¹⁰ A love without a work ends in a waste. In sum, against Lacanian antiphilosophy, which focuses on the symptomatic real in love, Badiouian philosophy claims that love is not merely a relation between symptoms but a creation of truth, which serves as an access not only to the true life beyond the drive but also to happiness beyond satisfaction.

¹⁰ See Badiou, "L'immanence des vérités (2): Séminaire d'Alain Badiou, 2013-2014."

Between Analytic Act and Philosophical Operation

The second theme of the dialogue between antiphilosophy and philosophy concerns the antiphilosophical act and the philosophical operation. An antiphilosopher asserts the irreducibility of his proper act against the philosophical tradition. For instance, Nietzsche, who puts life and body before Platonic ideas and Christian morality, declares as follows: “It is not inconceivable that I am the first philosopher of the age, perhaps even a little more, something decisive and doom-laden standing between two millennia” (qtd. in Badiou, “Who Is Nietzsche?” 5). For Nietzsche, his proper existence (“I am”) is something that exceeds (“a little more”) the entire philosophical tradition and inscribes a rupturing point in it. An antiphilosopher is someone for whom his radical act, dramatic life, and singular existence can outstrip, destroy, and refashion philosophical ideas and doctrines.

In the case of Lacan, he presents the analytic act as an irreducible chimera to philosophy. For the analysand (the patient), the analytic act provokes a singular experience to encounter his/her real unconscious beyond conscious self-identity. For the analyst, the analytic act means the clinical practice of demonstrating the subjective real by occupying the position of the object cause of desire, which provides for the deconstruction of the analysand’s pre-established fantasy. The analytic act of encountering and demonstrating the real offers us what is unprecedented in philosophy, whose focus lies in contemplating and theorizing general ideas and abstract truths. But this does not mean that the analytic act is mystical and ecstatic. The unique aspect of the analytic act is that unlike previous antiphilosophers like Kierkegaard, who presented a mystical and transcendental notion of the act (subjective choice about the absolute), the Lacanian act is logical and formal due to the operation of the psychoanalytically appropriated mathematical letter (“mathemes”). The effect of the analytic work must and can be verified and shared. The act is open to the possibility of the construction and transmission of knowledge. In sum, the Lacanian act shows the real in the form of a singular knowledge, in order to surpass the philosophical truth in the form of a general concept.

Let us flesh out the analytic act in reference to “Tony Takitani.” Let us begin with Lacan’s definition of drugs from the “Culture aux Journées d’études des Cartels” in 1975: “There is no other definition for drugs than this one: it is what allows for the breaking of the marriage with the phallus” (268). In addictions, the phallus as a means of limiting *jouissance* is broken down so that an unbridled *jouissance* emerges and possesses the subject. When the phallus as the signifier of the lack is

no longer operative, what rules is the excess of *jouissance* that suspends rational cognizance. Submerged in the a-subjective flux of *jouissance*, the subject of addiction repeats pathological acts helplessly. Tony's wife confesses, "I don't need so many dresses, I know that. But even if I know it, I can't help myself" (Murakami 196). In the story, one cannot find a clue about the etiology and genealogy of her symptom, but one could diagnose that this excessive *jouissance* works in concert with her fantasmatic attachment to her body image. Her compulsive buying functions as a means of preserving and protecting her idealized body image. The act of looking at herself in a mirror wearing the new clothing would give her a tremendous amount of pleasure. She is in love with her well-dressed body image. More precisely, she is suspended between her self-love and love for Tony, wherein lies her subjective impasse. Expanding his early ideas about the mirror stage, Lacan states, "Self-love is the principle of imagination. The speaking being adores his body so that he believes that he has it. In reality, he does not have it. His body is his sole consistency, mental consistency, for his body always goes away" (*SXXIII* 52). In what sense does the speaking being not have a body? A body can be divided into the real body as bundle of partial drives and the imaginary body as mental consistency. As biological need is filtered through the symbolic order, speaking beings' lives are not based on natural need but on the de-naturalized drive. The multiple, fragmentary drives keep us from having a unified body. If we can have a unified body, it is because the body image reduces the real body's inconsistent drives to a consistent form. The imaginized body helps us to control inconsistency through consistency, and herein lies the adoration of the body. Our self-love is based on the adoration of the imaginized body. In the case of Tony's wife, we can state that she has an excessive adoration of her body, for the image with new clothing provides for the endless metamorphosis of her body. Her symptom would even offer her an over-exciting interplay among consistencies beyond the soothing reduction of inconsistency to consistency. In sum, the core of her symptom lies in the interaction between unbridled *jouissance* and attachment to her body image.

To deal with her symptom, the analytic act would have to implement a "correct symbolization" ("symbolisation correcte") (Lacan, *Autres écrits* 423). A correct symbolization amounts to "elevating impotence (which accounts for fantasy) to logical impossibility (which incarnates the real)" ("d'élever l'impuissance [celle qui rend raison du fantasme] à l'impossibilité logique [celle qui incarne le réel]") (*Autres écrits* 551). The analytic act should examine her impotence due to her fantasy about the idealized body image. The analysis should clarify that the

adoration of the body would serve as a screen around her subjective real, and that beneath her imaginary love lies her real problem. Now, the revelation of the subjective real is a difficult and rare thing. As Lacan states, “The trouble of the truth has been rejected into the shadows. But at the real, not a thing is ever seen of it” (“Le trouble de la vérité en soit rejeté aux ténèbres. Mais au réel, il n’est jamais vu que du feu, même ainsi illustré.”) (*Autres écrits* 443). Note that Lacan’s antiphilosophical gesture is grounded in the distinction between truth and the real in terms of the extent to which the analytic work reveals the two. One can bring the repressed subjective truth into light, albeit in a partial way. But the real is a different story, for it is a completely unexplored territory. Moreover, the revelation of the real would provoke the analysand’s violent resistance as in a negative therapeutic response, for the analysand does not give up on his/her symptom and loves it like him/herself. The revelation of the real is also not a pleasant thing for the analyst, for it not only necessitates the deposition of his/her status from a subject supposed to know to a waste object but also triggers anxiety, which explains why the analyst has an aversion to his act. Nevertheless, it is through the repetitive encounter with the real that the analytic act proceeds. As Lacan states, “it is only in pushing the impossible in its deductions that impotence takes on the power of turning the patient into the agent” (“Ce n’est qu’à pousser l’impossible en ses retranchements que l’impuissance prend le pouvoir de faire tourner le patient à l’agent.”) (*Autres écrits* 446). The analytic act should provide for the becoming-subject of the analysand. The analytic act should also offer a chance for the analysand to move from a patient in the impotent imaginary to an agent of the impossible real. The analytic act should assist the analysand in grappling with his/her unrecognized real, rather than leading him/her to conform to and compromise with reality. Clinically, a correct symbolization should work in concert with the symbolization of *jouissance*. Once the subjective real is encountered, the fatal *jouissance* implied therein must be symbolized. In the case of Tony’s wife, once her subjective real is revealed, a symbolic apparatus to limit her addictive *jouissance* needs to be invented. Then, she could be engaged in a process of refashioning the existing unconscious into a new unconscious that still determines but does not devastate herself. In sum, the analytic act serves as an occasion for her change through the encounter with the subjective real.

At this point, the implication that the analytic act has for an antiphilosophical love becomes clear. Although the analytic act might eventually trigger a subjective change, the change must come from within the subject, not from without. If it comes from without, this implies that the change is enforced rather than subjective.

And an enforced change implies that some kind of a master preaches about the efficacy of the act and indoctrinates the subject about it, which Lacan opposes at two levels. There is no such thing as “the master of the analytic act” (*SXV* 1/24/1968). Moreover, “that which saves me from teaching is the act” (“ce qui me sauve de l’enseignement, c’est l’acte.”) (my trans.; qtd. in Badiou, *LL3* 212). For psychoanalysis, love is a question of subjective change. As Jacques-Alain Miller puts it, if “to really love someone is to believe that by loving them you’ll get to a truth about yourself,” then love necessarily entails a subjective change.¹¹ But this change does not happen through the indoctrination of the truth via a philosopher as master. It arrives only immanently through self-initiated experience of and experimentation with the real without a master armed with dogma. In this regard, the analytic act confirms what every lover often experiences. With the intervention of didactic and moralizing wisdom, there only transpires a lovers’ quarrel. Here, Eros turns into Ares.

A subjective change happens outside of any intention, expectation, or prediction about change, and even outside hope for change, which often refers back to the orchestrating master and pre-programmed teaching. The analytic act serves as the occasion for change, but it is never directly aimed at change. Instead, it is aimed at the end of analysis, which Lacan calls the *Passe* as the subjective transformation from the analysand to the analyst. The *Passe* does not lie in passing through some place or in moving from one place to another. The *Passe* lies in seeing and rediscovering the impasse. “The end of analysis is when one has gone round in circles twice, rediscovered that of which one is prisoner. . . . It is enough for one to see what one is captive of” (*SXXV* 1/10/1978). The point is not about escaping from what one is captive of but rather facing it. A change might come from the acceptance and exploration of the impossibility of a change. A subjective change can come only from the recurrent process of turning around the real in circles without any consciousness or program about change. In this regard, the analytic act suggests that the subject of love is first and foremost the subject of waiting.

Does such a thing as Lacanian waiting exist? In *Seminar XXV*, Lacan writes, “The real is the impossible to simply write, or in other words, does not cease not to be written. The real is the possible waiting to be written” (*SXXV* 3/8/1977). Lacan redefines four modalities in terms of writing. Notably, Lacan here identifies the real not only as the impossible but also as the possible, and the mediator between the impossible and the possible is waiting. Let us specify three things. First, waiting is not an act of a master, as waiting cuts across the impossible and the possible. The

¹¹ See Miller.

master is ignorant of the impossible insofar as he/she resides in the world of already coordinated norms. Waiting is too much work for the subject as well, as waiting often exhausts and emasculates the subject. Let us rather state that the agent of waiting is the real as a pure inconsistency of the (im-)possible. The agent of waiting is between the possible waiting to be written and the impossible to be written. Second, waiting is not a question of messianism, for messianism implies that a pre-established demarcation exists between the impossible and the possible, which does not fit with a true waiting. Third, waiting is also not a question of passivity, for the construction of the analytic knowledge of the existing real accompanies analytic waiting for the real to come.

The same is true of the amorous waiting for change. The lover, who is hardly a master and barely a subject, is supposed to wait for a subjective change of the beloved (her subjective change from the fixation on her narcissistic totality to the revelation of her lack in general, or in the case of Tony's wife, a change from her self-indulgent love for symptomatic jouissance to her partaking in amorous joy with Tony), beyond the distinction between the impossible and the possible. This act of waiting must be coupled with an active engagement. Here, one could refer to Benjamin's aphorism in *One-Way Street* that "the only way of knowing a person is to love that person without hope" (62). The only way of loving a person is through an act of pure waiting, while inventing a singular knowledge of him or her. Love is an a-subjective act of waiting for subjective change, without hope, and yet in the making of knowledge, which is why love is not a thought but an act, an act of the impossible, just like the analytic is. Filled with antiphilosophical pride, Lacan declared, "My strength is to know what it means to wait" ("Mon fort est de savoir ce qu'attendre signifie.") (my trans.; qtd. in Badiou, *LL3* 232). In sum, love assumes the following axiom from the analytic act: Where the act of waiting for subjective change was, there love should arrive.

Let us turn to the problem of philosophical operation. According to Badiou, philosophical operation lies in organizing a conceptual space in which four types of truths—art, science, politics, and love—can coexist. This implies that philosophy does not directly produce truths but only seizes truths through the category of the truth. In other words, philosophy is not self-enclosed but conditioned. What is notable here is that philosophy maintains the category of truth as void, not as presence. Because it is left as void, new truths can come in, and there can be ever-incomplete yet infinite truth-processes rather than some substantial truth. When philosophy fills in the void of the truth, it provokes a disaster of thought in which an ecstatic place, a sacred name, and a terrifying injunction wield their power.

Philosophy then presents itself as a truth and reduces heterogeneous, singular truths into one privileged, substantial truth, as in Heidegger (art as the Truth) or in analytic philosophy (science as the Truth).

Now, antiphilosophy alerts philosophy that this philosophical operation is possible on the basis of contemporary truths. Antiphilosophy awakens philosophy to contemporary truths or, more precisely, untimely truths in the contemporary world as exceptional forms of political movement, scientific experimentation, artistic invention, and amorous passion. An antiphilosopher is a philosopher armed with an adamant conviction that philosophy does not operate through eternal contemplation or fashionable ideology; instead, philosophy thinks of truths in the contemporary world and yet pushes against its dominant norms. As Badiou writes, “The antiphilosopher recalls for us that a philosopher is a political militant, generally hated by the powers that be and by their servants; an aesthete, who walks ahead of the most unlikely creations; a lover, whose life is capable of capsizing for a woman or a man; a savant, who frequents the most violently paradoxical developments of the sciences; and that it is in this effervescence, this in-disposition, this rebellion, that philosophers produce their cathedrals of ideas” (WA 67).

If the untimely nature of truths is the radical message that philosophy accepts from antiphilosophy, philosophy goes one step further by conjoining untimely truths to the problem of happiness. Philosophy affirms that an immanent connection exists between philosophy and happiness. To refer to Plato’s discussion about happiness (*eudaimonia*), a truly happy man is a philosopher, not those with power, money, and fame. How would Badiou translate the term *eudaimonia*? Happiness as “good (*eu*) soul (*daimon*)” means the affect of the subject who participates in any type of truth. In fact, this point has an important implication in Badiou’s intellectual itinerary. What is at stake in *Being and Event* is the demonstration of the being of truths. But the problem is that the conceptual demonstration of the being of truths is disconnected from our concrete lives. *Logics of Worlds* demonstrates that truths not only are but also appear in the world, finally engaging with the problem of life. The problem of truth is thus extended into the true life. To overcome a mere formalism of truths, *Logics of Worlds* also presents the affects of truths, such as joy in love, enthusiasm in politics, beatitude in science, and pleasure in art. Recently, Badiou refers to all of these affects through the overarching category of happiness. The theme of happiness is expected to play a pivotal role in his forthcoming *Immanence of Truths*, whose main problematic concerns how being and the world look from the perspective of truths, not how truths are and appear from the perspective of being and the world. From the viewpoint of truths, nothing is more concrete and intensive

than happiness is, and philosophy-induced happiness allows us to experience the existing world in a different way. Here, the antiphilosophical act that pits the experiential drama of life against the formal system of concept is sublated into the philosophical operation. Through the traversal of antiphilosophy, philosophy not only contends that the true life with happiness is a matter of the becoming-subject of truth but also shows that the true life with happiness is not only a matter of conceptual demonstration but also of actual experience. Based on the adamant conviction that the subject of truth is the happiest in his/her life, philosophy moves from the theory of the true life to the experience of lived truths. As Badiou puts it, philosophy “goes from the life that proposes the existence of truths to the life that makes of this existence a principle, a norm, an experience” (“Elle [La philosophie] va donc de la vie, qui propose l’existence des vérités, à la vie qui fait de cette existence un principe, une norme, une expérience.”) (my trans.; *MBR* 83).

Also notable is the fact that *Immanence of Truths* is expected to address how the affects of truth are not only coexisting but also interlaced. The interlacing of the affects of truths seems to be a natural consequence, for one can doubt that the amorous joy of a total indifference to political issues deserves the category of happiness, let alone whether it is possible. Love opens up an underrepresented approach to politics precisely because it is neither political nor antipolitical. Moreover, the purification or absolutization of amorous joy serves the preservation of preestablished norms under the category of individual satisfaction. If a purified amorous joy as private satisfaction is equated with happiness, this is because the dominant worldly law encourages and promotes such an equation. For instance, if “the balance between work and life” or “success through self-improvement” is regarded as the formula of happiness, this is because it fits into the logic of capitalism. The point is not that a lover must be a revolutionary, but that happiness is redefined in relation to the worldly law that affects both love and politics. To expand Saint-Just’s proclamation that “happiness is a new idea in Europe” (“le bonheur est une idée neuve en Europe”), happiness will eternally have remained a new idea for anyone who finds that any pre-established law, whether existential or political, no longer holds. Badiouian happiness is thus not reduced or limited to one particular type of truth, such as amorous joy or political enthusiasm. Rather, it boils down to the co-existence of amorous joy and political enthusiasm, including the possibility of a rare link of the two.

This brings us into another Badiouian critical diagnosis of love in “Tony Takitani.” Yves Saint-Laurent states, “Wearing is a way of life” (“S’habiller est un mode de vie”). For Tony’s wife, wearing trendy clothes (s’habiller à la mode) is the

only way of life (and of death). The series of new clothes serve as a masquerade that interrupts her access to the truly subjective life because her life is subject to the capitalist logic of the endless circuit between production and consumption so that as soon as new clothes are on sale, she has to purchase them. Her shopping addiction is the paradigmatic case that proves that capitalism produces not only purchasable objects but also symptomatic subjects. Moreover, let us note that Tony himself is attracted to her style of clothing, that it makes him “happy” to see how perfectly natural she was in her clothes, and that the clothes play a pivotal role in triggering the end of their love and of her life. In this regard, the clothes act as a cupid in their love. It provokes their love, maintains it for a while, and suddenly terminates it according to its will. Tony and his wife do not know the extent to which their love is involved in consumer capitalism. In this regard, they are far from what Badiou calls minimal communism, or communism of the Two, in which amorous subjects puncture a local hole in the existing capitalist regime. Affected by capitalism and its product, their love does not attain happiness. The possible link between amorous joy and political enthusiasm is blocked out, and the dominant law of the world reduces happiness to a consumable item that causes the pathological symptom.

In fact, the philosophical thesis of happiness emerges as the outcome of the dialogue between antiphilosophy and philosophy. In *Métaphysique du bonheur réel*, the antiphilosopher brought up as the partner of this dialogue is Kierkegaard. Accepting Kierkegaardian ideas of choice, encounter, the absolute, and objective uncertainty, Badiou notes that the antiphilosopher’s lesson is that existence is capable of evoking the subjective possibility of becoming a part of the untimely truth. Our existence does not perfectly conform to the dominant contemporary ideology. It can be traversed by a contingent encounter, forced to choose between life and death, encouraged to participate in the absolute. Our existence contains numerous opportunities for us to wager on subjective lives supported by exceptional truths, beyond ordinary interests and daily concerns. Appropriating Kierkegaard’s equivalence between the choice of despair and the choice of the absolute, Badiou even affirms that “some amount of despair is the condition for real happiness” (“une certaine dose de désespoir est la condition du bonheur réel”) (my trans.; *MBR* 39). Despair as the loss of a preexisting identity constitutes the path for obtaining access to the absolute, the path of becoming a subject. The semblance of happiness as an imaginary satisfaction makes us prefer normative and illusive hope to exceptional and real despair. However, happiness does not lie in a self-contained state of keeping one’s distance from risks and adventures. Happiness lies only in the process of paying the price of despair and passing through ordeals.

Now, despite some affinities between Lacan and Kierkegaard as antiphilosophers, what matters for our discussion is the dialogue between Lacanian antiphilosophy and Badiouian philosophy concerning the issue of happiness, which is missing from Badiou's discussion. Let us construct this dialogue. In *Seminar VII*, Lacan points out that the analysand's aspiration for happiness is aimed at a mirage like "the possession of all women for a man and of an ideal man for a woman" (303). On the one hand, a masculine illusion exists regarding the despotic father of the primal horde who possesses every woman with his extraordinary virility. On the other hand, a feminine illusion exists regarding the omnipotent man who is not subordinate to castration and provides her with jouissance. Consequently, both sides are under the spell of a masculine ideal. Happiness comes down to a fantasy that the all-powerful phallus drives. In *Seminar XVII*, Lacan provides a formulation that directly links happiness to the phallus: "The only happiness is the happiness of the phallus" (73). The agent of happiness is the phallus. Although woman is originally excluded from the happiness of the phallus, man's situation is not so different. Man as the bearer of the phallus attempts to alleviate woman's privation of the phallus. However, man's handling of the phallus is immature, so man only ends up reminding woman of her privation. While the phallus serves as a medium through which to put a bridge between the two sexes, the operation of the phallus is fundamentally imperfect. Therefore, both sexes remain unsatisfied and disconcerted, for "one of them doesn't have and the other doesn't know what to do with [the phallus]" (76).

In *Seminar XVI*, Lacan equates happiness with surplus jouissance. Lacan asks, "If this Pascal . . . does not know what he is saying when he speaks about a happy life[,] . . . what else is graspable under the term of happy if not precisely this function incarnated in the surplus jouissance?" (23). Surplus jouissance is something that is obtained as a local compensation in the global loss of jouissance. One can get surplus jouissance only insofar as one initially renounces jouissance. It is a secondary gain for a primary loss. "The means of jouissance are open on the principle that he has renounced this closed, foreign jouissance, renounced the mother" (*SXVII* 78). In sum, although only the happiness of the phallus exists, what the subject can obtain is an alienated form of happiness as surplus jouissance. For Lacan, happiness is something that is fundamentally restricted and partially accessible.

However, let us not forget to read the inverse side of this antiphilosophical sarcasm. Behind the pessimistic irony regarding happiness, one could recognize a rigorous sobriety that remains vigilant with regard to the illusionistic semblance of

happiness. As we have noted, the analytic act does not make the analyst happy, and the same also applies to the analysand. However, the analytic act makes the analysand disillusioned about the fantasy about happiness. In his response to the analysand who asks for happiness, “the analyst knows that it [the question of the sovereign good as happiness] is a question that is closed. Not only doesn’t he have that sovereign good that is asked of him, but he also knows there isn’t any” (*SVII* 300). The analyst’s response makes the analysand penetrate the inexistence of pseudo-happiness, understood as individual comfort that the pre-established norm of sovereign good determines. What is at stake here is not pre-ordained happiness but rather the limit of desire that problematizes any pseudo-happiness. For happiness, there is no such thing as some model or ideal. One had better stay true to the unknown path of one’s desire beyond the normative and programmatic path of happiness. For Lacan, who does not propose a positive doctrine of happiness, happiness would probably come only through the subjective daring of never giving up one’s desire. Modern psychology, which presents a doctrine of happiness in terms of the ego, consciousness, natural development, and behavior, leads man to “harmony with himself as well as to approval from the world on which his happiness depends” (*TR* 10). As long as this happiness stems from approval from the world, it belongs only to “the field of conformity and even of social exploitation” (*TR* 10). Consequently, “man no longer knows how to find the object of his desire and no longer encounters anything but unhappiness in his search, living in an anguish that progressively shrinks what one might call his chance to invent” (*TR* 10). In contrast, Lacanian psychoanalysis observes that man can acquire access to happiness only by working through desire as his truth and by inventing a subjective happiness beyond psychic laws and social norms.

Coming back to “Tony Takitani,” it would have been much better from the analytic perspective if Tony and his wife had launched into the process of exploring her subjective real so that she could figure out why she is entangled in the symptom of addictive shopping. He should have allowed her to ask for herself whether her shopping serves the reinforcement of her personal myth about happiness, whether her sovereign good as consumptive happiness is possible only with the “service of goods” in the form of fashionable clothes. He should have given her a chance to think about whether her happiness is nothing but a luscious illusion regarding the omnipotence of her ego and an impotent enslavement to social norms, shorn of her subjective capacity to invent a new happiness for herself. Although this might be too much for Tony, who is not an analyst, this nevertheless is precisely what is required for their amorous process to last and move forward. And this is precisely

what Badiou's philosophy suggests for every subject of love. Reorienting her from individual satisfaction to real happiness, inviting her to elaborate the consequences of their encounter rather than sticking to her preexisting identity as a fashion lover, and encouraging her to transform what was impossible in her world (amorous joy in and against *jouissance*) to a new possibility: all of these constitute the difficult yet categorical task of the subject of love who turns toward happiness.

In sum, beyond the tension between antiphilosophy and philosophy concerning happiness, there is an active dialogue between the two. Whereas the analytic act stops at the point of untimeliness where the semblance of happiness as a pre-ordained norm is revealed and criticized, the philosophical operation affirms the positive link between untimely truths and happiness. For the former, what matters is a deconstruction of pseudo-happiness. For the latter, a reconstruction of real happiness must be tackled. An analysis of deceptive happiness and an articulation of true happiness are twins. And these twins can be juxtaposed, as in the last phrase of Beckett's *Ill Seen Ill Said*: "No. One moment more. One last. Grace to breathe that void. Know happiness" (59). Once one says "no" to what dominant norms of happiness dictate and orients oneself toward untimely truths, one will see that happiness lies in the void where the norms stumble and fall. Moving a little bit further ahead, one will see that real happiness can arrive only with the tenacious subjective creation of amorous truth.

Conclusion: An Inconclusive Dialogue on Love as Inconclusiveness

In "Equivocal Endings and the Theme of Love in Murakami Haruki's Love Stories," Virginia Yeung notes that love stories such as *Norwegian Wood*, *South of the Border*, and *Sputnik Sweetheart* have open-ended structures, arguing that Murakami's concept of love is inconclusiveness. Although this article is not devoted to a narratological study of the final scene of "Tony Takitani," this concept of love is crucial for our discussion as well because it is amorous inconclusiveness that makes the dialogue between antiphilosophy and philosophy continue without any definitive end or final verdict. With antiphilosophy, we can confirm that the beloved's symptomatic real poses a challenge to love and that the lover is supposed to cultivate the quasi-analytic amorous act for subjective change. With philosophy, we can articulate that the amorous truth lies in passing through the symptomatic real and that love entails a metaphysical happiness beyond animalistic satisfaction. The suggestion of this article is that one should hold onto both antiphilosophical

and philosophical readings to recognize love's inconclusiveness, insofar as neither antiphilosophy nor philosophy can monopolize love. From the antiphilosophical viewpoint, the symptom of Tony's wife was too deep, to the point of causing her death, while Tony was not experienced enough to work through her pathological symptom and provoke subjective change. Tony and his wife experienced a limit proper to love, one that can make love run aground at any unexpected moment. From the philosophical viewpoint, Tony and his wife should have passed through the revelation of her symptomatic real, which would have allowed them to construct an amorous truth beyond simply falling in love and to relish happiness beyond satisfaction. Tony and his wife missed an infinity proper to love that can be given by transforming the symptomatic body into a new body of love and puncturing the dominant capitalist norms. While the psychoanalytic reading allows us to recognize the immanent flaw of love, the philosophical reading allows us to envision the unrealized possibility of love that can be drawn counterfactually. In this regard, "Tony Takitani" allows for both a vivid description of the limit of love and an apophatic demonstration of the infinity of love. It provokes both a sober description of the inherent vice of love and an indirect prescription of the necessary virtue of love.

However, what this article addresses hardly covers all aspects of "Tony Takitani." Given that subjectivity plays a pivotal role in love and that the core of Tony's subjective real (solitude) is closely related to his father, it is worth considering the father-son relationship. In fact, solitude not only represents postmodern society, in which relationships are precarious and fluid, but also serves as a transgenerational symptom that cuts across Tony and his father: "Father and son were not as different from each other as one might imagine. But, being the kind of people they were, imbued to an equal degree with a habitual solitude, neither took the initiative to open his heart to the other" (Murakami 189). One should also consider how to read the final scene, in which Tony returns to his solitude after letting go of his wife and burning his dead father's records, to evaluate the sense in which this solitude is distinct from his previous solitude. Concerning Tony's wife, while this article attributed the role of analyst to Tony and the role of analysand to his wife in our discussion of the analytic act, a closer look at the scene in which Tony's wife is killed in a car accident suggests a different line of reading. While her shopping addiction is deep, her love and respect for Tony are equally deep. Thus, she decides to return all the clothes that she had bought at the clothing shop. Her car accident happens when she feels bodily anxiety after having returned the clothes, as if going through withdrawal symptoms. Thus, while her struggle with her

symptom ends in a tragedy, it is also clear that she had decided to remain faithful to the amorous truth rather than stick to her previous identity. She indeed attempts to transform her previous symptomatic body into the body of amorous truth. In this regard, unlike Tony, who did not know how to work through his wife's symptomatic real and failed to measure up to the analytic/amorous act, his wife exemplifies what we might call an archi-amorous act. Tony's wife shows us that to love is to defy one's existing identity and create a new subjectivity that can support the amorous process. While this article could not fully address these aspects of the story, one thing is certain: these and (many other) aspects of the story not only render the discussion between antiphilosophy and philosophy on love inconclusive but also make the intrinsic inconclusiveness of love all the more palpable. If Murakamian love is inconclusive, then there is no determinate conclusion to the dialogue about it. After all, we can never come to a conclusion when conversing about something inconclusive.

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