Abstract

The transgressive flows of anti-globalization have powerfully demonstrated the grassroots counter-hegemonic process of “globalization-from-below.” In this paper, I would argue that anti-globalization does not necessarily aim to assault globalization per se. Rather, it aims to deconstruct—not destroy—the rise of a U.S.-based form of imperial globality. Much effort has been made to define, support, warn of and/or denounce the phenomenon of globalization, which has been accelerating since the 1970s. However, studies of anti-globalization have received relatively less attention. Worse yet, the anti-globalization movement has frequently been distorted and smeared. By mainly using the Derridean “logic of hauntology” and the Levinasian “I-Other relation,” I attempt to throw theoretical light upon the intersecting forces of spectrality, which give ethico-political meaning to the acts of anti-globalization. In so doing, I hope to show that the on-going transgressive flows of resistance in the economy of anti-globalization underscore a Levinasian belief: “The ethical resistance is the presence of infinity.”

Keywords

transgression, flow, the Other, hauntology, anti-globalization, globalization, justice
A question of repetition: a specter is always a 
reve-nant. One cannot control its comings and goings 
because it begins by coming back. 
—Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx

If the global cannot be interpreted literally, as a uni-
versal phenomenon, then the concept of globali-
ization seems to be little more than a synonym for 
Westernization or Americanization.
—David Held and Anthony McGrew, 
Globalization/Anti-Globalization

Specters, or more precisely the specters of the Other, are inexorably haunting 
globalization. Favoring free-market economy over social justice and environmental 
ecology, globalization as the most updated form of modernity is admittedly under-
going its severest test to date. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 tragedy, such a 
test yet takes on a new and even greater sense of urgency and severity. The trans-
national protests by the anti-globalization movement, demanding justice for diverse 
repressed others, have threatened the established systems of the new world order. 
Doubtlessly, globalization as an increasingly dynamic interplay of energy has created a 
novel and somewhat euphoric phenomenon of “time-space compression” or “deterri-
torialization”; it makes the world seem so far away yet so near, projecting its rosy 
future into the twenty-first century. Driven by neo-liberal capitalism and modern 
technologies, globalization at its best has been undertaken to promote the free and fair 
flow of a transnational economy and culture with a view to a better world to come.

However, not to be ignored is the fact that the process of globalization is domi-
nated by the wealthiest countries mainly for their own interest. The rosy promises of a 
global future shared by everyone on earth are criticized as pipe dreams. Indeed, 
globalization has conjured up diverse haunting specters, embodied in the numerous 
ethico-political protests concerned with environmental protection, third world poverty,

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1 As a newly shaped and powerful discourse, “environmental ecology” provides a study of environ-
mental (I-Other) ethics, of the ecological effects of pollution and other disturbances on our oceans, lakes, 
forests, and air. Environmental ecologists believe that “like ecology, environmental science is multi- and 
interdisciplinary” (Freedman 1).

2 Since the beginning of the new millennium, the development of globalization has faced at least four 
serious setbacks: (1) the devastating 9/11 attacks on the very center of world globalization, New York, 
by global terrorism; (2) the collapse of Argentina in a debt crisis—a country once praised as a model of 
pro-globalization reform; (3) the downfall of the “dotcoms”—technology companies being hit especially 
hard by the recent global recession, which featured the Silicon Valley bust; and (4) the transnational 
anti-globalization movement.
marginal cultures, nuclear weapons, ethnic conflicts, linguistic colonization, etc. According to Derrida: “Hegemony still organizes the repression and thus the confirmation of a haunting. Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony” (*Specters* 37). Where there is repression there is a resistance, frequently in the form of spectrality, of ethico-political haunting that brings in moments of *rupture*. The anti-globalization movement, I believe, introduces resistances in the form of dynamic and transgressive flows in an era of expanding transnational connections and global capital.

Clearly, as a radical political stance of opposition to the unjust aspects of globalization, anti-globalization (a term loathed and questioned by many anti-globalizers) does not necessarily aim to dismantle globalization. Most anti-globalization movements want to challenge the unequivocal domination of one mode of signifying system over another by teasing out warring forces of signification from within the “misgovernment” headed by, for example, the World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. They resolve to *deconstruct* (rather than destroy) the current global cultural transmissions and economic connections. When studying anti-globalization movements, I think it is a mistake to lump all anti-globalizers together and devilize them as “neo-Marxists,” “chic activists,” “neo-Luddites,” “Yuppie freaks,” “flat-Earth advocates,” “militant radicals,” “anarchists,” or “anti-capitalist pipe dreamers.”

Much has been written to define, warn of or denounce globalization as it has been developing since the 1970s. Studies of anti-globalization, however, have received relatively less attention. Worse yet, the anti-globalization movement has frequently been politically distorted and its advocates smeared. While giving the phenomenon of anti-globalization the attention it deserves, I will not presume to examine the agendas or interests of any specific anti-globalization “specters” in this paper. Rather, by mainly deploying the Derridean “logic of hauntology” (the eternal return of singularity)

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3 Some anti-globalization activists and supporters regard the term “anti-globalization” as a political misnomer. They prefer more nuanced terms, like “anti-Americanization,” “anti-capitalist,” “anti-corporate” or “alternative globalization.” In truth, anti-globalizers are not really “anti-” globalization since they are true globally-conscious internationalists. Naomi Klein summarizes this issue well in her open letter to the Prime Minister of the European Union (Cuy Verhofstadt), titled “Making and Breaking the Rules” in *Fences and Windows*. She rightly claims that the real target of anti-globalization is not globalization itself but the single and hegemonic mode of neo-liberalism. To be precise, the term “anti-globalization” I employ in this paper should be understood as an abbreviated form of “anti-the-authoritarian-mode-of-globalization.”

4 For a more down-to-earth account of the pros and cons of globalization and different anti-globalization case studies, see Klein; Held and McGrew; Joseph E. Stiglitz; and Louise Amoore.
and the Levinasian “I-Other relation” (the ethics of ethics), I will attempt to explore the multiple, intense and intersecting (even contradictory) forces producing the current phenomenon of anti-globalization.

I. Mapping the Logic of Hauntology

The time is out of joint.
—William Shakespeare, Hamlet

To haunt does not mean to be present, and it is necessary to introduce haunting into the very construction of a concept. Of every concept, beginning with the concepts of being and time. That is what we would be calling here a hauntology. Ontology opposes it only in a movement of exorcism.
—Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx

The development of his theory of deconstruction led Derrida to produce in 1994 a controversial book, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, which examines the specters of Marx, especially in The Eighteenth Brumaire and The German Ideology. Regarded as “the long-awaited direct encounter between Derrida and Marxism,” this book “confront[s] head-on the relationship of deconstruction and Marxism, to subject Marx’s texts to the same kind of exegetical rigor that he had already brought to bear on those of Plato, Rousseau, Heidegger and many, many others” (Sprinker 1). Taking the theory of deconstruction back to that specific historical entanglement which conditioned its genesis, it seems to me this book ushers early text-oriented deconstruction into social and political arenas and thus into, in a sense, a post-deconstructive era. This much-anticipated book, however, does not provide us with a traditional political or social theory, whether for or against Marxism, because “deconstruction has never been Marxist, no more than it has been non-Marxist, although it has remained faithful to a certain spirit of Marxism” (Derrida, Specters 75). Rather, Derrida problematizes here terms such as “problema,” “specters,” “ghosts,” “spirits,” “haunting,” “mourning,” “debt,” and “inheritance,” not only to introduce his notion of “spectropoetics” (a deconstructive reading of Marx), but
also to re-align Marx’s political critique of capitalism (“the living ghosts”) with deconstruction in an environment hostile to traditional Marxist ideology. As Derrida makes clear, “the inheritance of a certain Marxist spirit (specter) remains a duty” (Specters 87).

For Derrida, hauntology is the ghost’s ontology which cannot be ontologized in the linear and progressive process between life and death or between the actual and the virtual. The logic of hauntology signifies the eternal return of singularity, the infinite trace of the present-absent specter. Haunting as iterability always leads to alteration through returning. Derrida explains: “[r]epetition and the first time, but also repetition and the last time, since the singularity of any first time makes of it also a last time. Each time it is the event itself, a first time is a last time. Altogether other. Staging for the end of history. Let us call it a Hauntology” (Specters 10). Yet, how is the logic of hauntology relevant to our discussion of anti-globalization? In Specters of Marx, Derrida discovers the sustainable spectrality in Marx’s work as a call for lost justice in the nineteenth century. And as spectrality was there in Marx’s politics of resistance against the hegemony of early capitalism, so are there specters, as I would argue in this paper, that uphold, in any politics of resistance that seeks a just society, the position of the Other.

Famously, The Communist Manifesto begins with an apocalyptic statement: “A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of Communism. All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this specter” (Marx and Engels 221). In this manifesto, Marx and Engels set out their analysis of a time that is “out of joint” (to borrow from Shakespeare’s Hamlet) and inscribe a promise, also a demand, that affairs (will) be put right. The specter is what traverses Marx’s work, not once but several times, returning and re-returning following a temporal logic of its own, not as one and the same ghost but as a plus d’un (more than one/no more one). Who or what is this specter? What is its history and temporal logic? Why does it keep on re-turning? What does it want? These amongst others are the questions Derrida keeps asking in Specters of Marx in an attempt to seek out and entertain a certain spirit of Marx, a voice that calls for justice, a demand that is urgent for us today despite (and because of) the chorus proclaiming the final triumph of free-market economics and liberalism. To offer hospitality to this ethical spirit of Marx and at the same time deliver a decisive blow to the alchemists of the “end,” Derrida reads Hamlet alongside several texts authored by Marx and in the process formulates a “logic of hauntology” or of spectrality which leaves open the Marxist texts, making possible the separation of Marx’s own notions of
teleology from his ethical demand. One may thus argue that the ethico-political resistance of anti-globalization in our postmodern era is somehow an heir to Marx’s anti-capitalism specters.

And yet, can we know precisely what the specter is or whether it is living or dead? Is it sensual or non-sensual? Is it spirit or body? Derrida asserts:

[T]he specter is a paradoxical incorporation, the becoming-body, a certain phenomenal and carnal form of spirit. It becomes, rather, some “thing” that remains difficult to name: neither soul nor body, and both one and the other. For it is flesh and phenomenality that give to the spirit its spectral apparition, but which disappear right away in the apparition, in the very coming of the revenant or the return of the specter. [...] One does not know [whether] it is living or if it is dead. Here is—or rather there is, over there, an unnameable or almost unnameable thing. (Specters 6)

That is, the specter is “a paradoxical incorporation” of body and spirit; it is neither and both at the same time, a phenomenal and carnal form of the spirit. One cannot clearly see this “thing” (as it is not a thing) in flesh and blood, precisely name it in language or completely know it in knowledge. It is invisible between its apparitions, when it visibly re-turns and re-appears. Accordingly, spectrality can be seen as a new mode of différance or the ethical and political mode of “signification” of a pre-originary singularity, i.e., the Other. The affirmation of différance is the affirmation of the Other as other, therefore, undeniably ethical. One may safely argue that Derrida’s crucial leap from the textual abyss to sociality, from the responsible yet ultimately meaningless affirmation of play to the affirmation of play in the meaningful life as responsibility-to-and-for-the-Other, could not have been fully understood without his reference to Emmanuel Levinas’s texts on “I-Other relation.”

Fredric Jameson provides us in “Marx’s Purloined Letter” with a helpful critique and interpretation of “spectrality.” He believes that Derrida’s newly-developed figurality—the figural concepts of the specter and spectrality are “modifications” or “inflections” of deconstruction by which Derrida attempts to demonstrate that deconstruction can handle concepts in general. “Spectrality” is, to him, “not difficult to circumscribe, as what makes the present waver: like the vibrations of a heat wave through which the massiveness of the object world—indeed of matter itself—now shimmers like a mirage” (85). Besides, the messianic specter belongs to both the
unborn (future) and the dead (past). Jameson argues that “the messianic is spectral; it is the spectrality of the future, the other dimension, the answers to the haunting spectrality of the past which is historicity” (108). Thus, the messianic singularity of vibrating heat exactly signifies this undulating, shimmering co-existence of a first time in the past and a last time in the future—the event of coming back as a singular haunting.

In his *Politics of Friendship* (1997), Derrida re-confirms that a haunting spectrality belongs not only to the past but also to the future, a messianic future which signifies the messianic iterability of spectrality. For instance, reading *Human, All Too Human* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in terms of the logic of hauntology, Derrida claims that Nietzsche’s notions of “the friend of the most distant” and “superman” are “phantom friends”\(^5\) who come not from our past but from our messianic “yet-to-come” future:

These friends returned as the phantom of our past—in sum, our memory, the silhouette of the ghost who not only *appears* to us (*phantamata*, phenomena, phantoms, things of sight, things of respect, the respect which returns and comes down to the specter), but an *invisible* past, hence a past that can speak, and speak to us in an icy voice, “as if we were hearing ourselves.” Here, this should be exactly the opposite, since it is a question of the friend, of the superman whose present friendship urges the arrival. Not the past friend, but the friend to come. (287-88)

With a persistent effort to counter aspects of the current process of globalization, many anti-globalizers are precisely “these friends returned as the phantom of our past.” In truth, the anti-globalization is the Other of globalization, re-turned to question the injustice created by neo-liberalism. It simultaneously represents its own dark past and a messianic future, its own friend and enemy. Uncompromisingly disrupting the narcissism of globalization, anti-globalization should be seen as a true friend of globalization because it is its true enemy in the first place. “If you want a friend, you must also be willing to wage war for him: and to wage war, you must be *capable* of being an

\(^5\) Nietzsche claims that “[h]igher than love of one’s neighbor stands love of the most distant man and of the man of the future; higher still than love of man I account love of causes and phantoms. This phantom that runs along behind you, my brother, is fairer than you; why do you not give it your flesh and bones? But you are afraid and you run to your neighbor” (*Zarathustra* 87).
enemy,” thus spoke Zarathustra (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 82). The voice of the spectral Other always interrupts and threatens (yet does not replace) the illusive hegemony of our egoism. The ego accordingly must alter itself in responding to its alterity (Levinas), its lack (Lacan), its spectral enemy (Nietzsche) and—in the case of globalization—its repressed others as haunting specters and, at the same time, as possibilities of justice and of a better future to come. Accordingly, rather than rejecting its spectral enemy, globalization must learn to welcome anti-globalization like an old friend with Levinasian hospitality. Also, it must constantly examine and reform its own misgovernment in order to meet “the friend of the most distant” (Nietzsche, Zarathustra 87).

Here, spectrality implies an I-Other relationship that opens itself incessantly to exteriority as an infinite proximity. Infinity is absolute exteriority, hence radical separation from the totality of inside and outside. In Difficult Freedom, Levinas defines infinity as metaphysical transcendence, the absolute disparity between form and content. Infinity is something one has no idea of. The Derridean spectrality as an incessant and irreducible relationship with the repressed in the logic of hauntology signifies just such a Levinasian secret-structured infinity in the “I-Other relation.” After mapping the logic of hauntology, I will, in the following two sections, examine the ideas of the specter’s language (as gaze) and its time (as justice) to further explore the I-Other relation between globalization and anti-globalization. My goal is to see how we can theorize a hauntology of anti-globalization as a form of postmodern ethico-political resistance.

II. Constructing Anti-Globalization Forces

The question then becomes: what languages and visions will be appropriate to today’s problem-space of capitalist hegemony and counter-hegemonic struggles?

—Arturo Escobar, “Beyond the Third World"

_I see myself seeing myself._

The best-known anti-globalization protest in the U.S. occurred on 30 November 1999, in Seattle, Washington. Approximately 60,000 protesters of all environmental, political and social persuasions (some demonstrators were permitted, such as the members of AFL-CIO, yet groups with other affinities were not permitted in the march) blocked the delegates’ entrance to the WTO meeting. At length, they forced the WTO to cancel its meeting on the issue of globalization. During the demonstration, the Seattle riot police, in conjunction with the National Guard and the Delta Forces of the U.S. Army, using tear gas, rubber bullets, night sticks and pepper spray, clashed violently with the protesters. In fact, the violence used by the government only made the protesters more hostile. The situation went from bad to worse. Many shops owned by multinational corporations (like Nike, Starbucks, and McDonalds) in the city were smashed by furious protesters. The city mayor finally had to put Seattle under the municipal equivalent of martial law and declare a curfew to repress the “riot” (more than 600 protesters were arrested and dozens injured by the end). This anti-globalization event did not fold here, however. It started to unfold globally by coming back again and again (a revenant) to generate a Bakhtinian festival-like culture of resistance.

Actually, since Seattle the protesters have become more violent. They have resolved to fight for a world worth living in. The imperial “globality”—an economic-military-ideological empire—that subordinates certain regions, peoples and economies must be put under erasure. Consequently, about 25,000 protesters fought against the police at a European Union summit in Goteborg (Sweden), and more than 100,000 demonstrators were attracted to Genoa (Italy) during the G8 summit, when an Italian protester was killed by the police during a demonstration. Similar violent anti-globalization acts occurred in Quebec (Canada), Barcelona (Spain), Paris (France), London (U.K.), New Delhi (India), Jakarta (Indonesia), Brasilia (Brazil), Doha (Qatar), Melbourne (Australia), and Washington (U.S.A.). One may wonder why the decision makers in these many places keep on refusing to negotiate in a more peaceful way with their own haunting specters, perhaps on a Levinasian face-to-face basis, instead of letting the anti-globalization protest spread like a blazing forest fire. I would argue that the refusal of the U.S.-led capitalist hegemony to meet its haunting others face-to-face is due to its sense of insecurity and its inability to examine its own injustices.

Take the U.S. invasion of Iraq in early 2003 for example. As Escobar rightly puts it, “[a]mong other things, this episode has at least made two things particularly clear: first, the willingness to use an unprecedented level of violence to enforce dominance
on a global scale; second, the unipolarity of the current empire” (213). Since the Reagan-Thatcher years, the U.S.-led late-capitalist regime has tried to regulate the so-called “global disorder” “through the management of asymmetrical and spatialised violence, territorial control, sub-contracted massacres, and ‘cruel little wars’” (213-14). However, this strategy only pushes chaos to the periphery of the neo-liberal empire, creating what Escobar calls “predatory peace” in order to ensure the hegemonic illusion of globalization. In truth, due to its sense of insecurity and its inability to examine its own injustices, the U.S.-led late-capitalist “order” has kept on shrugging off its responsibility for the well-being of its others, leaving their poverty unresolved, their sufferings unending, and their calls for help unheard. For instance, there are tens of thousands of children who are starving to death in Africa, while the “globalization authorities” (such as the WTO, WB, IMF and G8), secure in their unipolar politics of exclusion, are actually doing nothing. Certainly, their inability to respond effectively to the urgent calls of the Other has generated new possibilities of global violence which loom large in the on-going manifestations and events of anti-globalization.

One may consider the anti-globalization protests as offering the U.S.-led neo-liberal order the opportunity to enter a less violent economy, or what Derrida calls “an economy of violence,” if those in power can truly see their blindness and seek a degree of socio-economic justice. However, the violence continues as those in power remain indifferent to their haunting specters. Indifference symbolizes nothing but a brutal refusal to face the Other. It is the easiest, quickest and surest way to breed the worst and most insidious form of violence: terrorism. Terrorism gives shape to the most irrational, fearsome, violent ghosts of anti-globalization. Those in power must realize this fact: only through an ethical concern with its others (or Other) can the process of globalization rid itself of terrorist violence. The current vicious cycle of (anti)globalization can be broken only if the agents of globalization are willing to maintain an ethical relationship with their excluded, anxious and furious others.

Another noticeable feature of the force of anti-globalization is that its specters speak in divergent languages. The protesters have different visions, ends and means for

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6 For Derrida, discourse can only do itself violence and negate itself in order to affirm itself. Philosophy, as the discourse of the Self, can only open itself to the question of violence within and by itself. In his words, “violence against violence, light against light” (Writing 117) and “[o]ne never escapes the economy of war” (Writing 148). In other words, if metaphysics imposes a violence of assimilation, one must fight against this violence with a certain other violence, a violence of revolutionary action against a violence of police action. It is this endless repetition of violence that makes the economy of violence irreducible.
their anti-globalization movement. This accounts for the diversity and mobility of the haunting specters. The anti-globalization alliance has drawn together environmentalists, leftists, organized laborers, farmers, feminists, animal-rights supporters, third-world sympathizers, pacifists, local culture supporters, anarchists, the Black Bloc members, etc. Its diversity seems to weaken its political solidarity. One of the most-heard criticisms of anti-globalization activism is that it lacks coherent objectives, the views of different protesters being sometimes even contradictory. Moreover, there is no single organizing power behind the huge alliance of anti-globalization.\footnote{According to Christopher Brooks, the anti-globalization movement suffers from two limitations: “(1) the movement cannot exclude participants without undermining its legitimacy, and (2) its lack of a centralized organizational framework makes it impossible to police the actions of participants during major protests” (559).} Realizing the difficulties confronting many anti-globalizers, I nonetheless would point out that the lack of coherent goals and means could actually create the very strength of an anti-globalization movement, for it guarantees the diversity and mobility of spectrality, rendering the specters not so easily exorcised. To a certain extent, the incoherence of the anti-globalization movement manifests the uncontainable power of what Julia Kristeva calls the semiotic.

In \textit{Revolution in Poetic Language}, Kristeva transforms Lacan’s distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic orders into a distinction between the semiotic and the symbolic, the two phases of the signifying process in/of language. The symbolic is the logical, coherent syntax and rationality of the adult, while the semiotic, linked to the pre-Oedipal primary processes, is the endless flow of subversive impulses that undermine the symbolic order. Kristeva writes:

\begin{quote}
We shall call \textit{symbolic} the logical and syntactic function of language and everything which, in translinguistic practices, is assimilable to the system of language proper. The term \textit{semiotic}, on the other hand, will be used to mean: […] the return of these facilitations in the form of rhythms, intonations and lexical, syntactic and rhetorical transformation. (68)
\end{quote}

In terms of literary language and cultural praxis, Kristeva believes that this “feminine” poetic language brings the subversive openness of the semiotic into society’s closed symbolic order. Likewise, due to the incoherent diversity and “feminine” mobility of spectrality, anti-globalization can never be fully pinned down
as a sign, either signifier or signified. With its constitutive diversity and undecidability, the force of anti-globalization provides a source, a kind of semiotic reservoir, for the symbolic process of globalization.

Perhaps the complex relationship between the specter, (semiotic) haunting, and the symbolic force of globalization also corresponds to that between the unsaid, the saying and the said language, as explored by Levinas in *Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence*. Levinas persuasively argues that the said is the statement of being, as opposed to the saying, which issues from the other; the former is placed over the latter in language. Prior to linguistic saying, the proximity of the other presents itself as the very signifyingness of signification, or as, perhaps, the possibility of saying in language. The moment this possibility is realized in language, the saying is subordinated to the said. Moreover, the said is the utterance of being’s other, hence betraying the saying. However, “[t]he Saying is maintained within the Said as the permanent possibility of the latter’s interruption” (Bernasconi and Critchley xiv).

Levinas believes that the said is interrupted and transcended by the saying to which the said must be ethically and politically brought back, for justice to be served. Anti-globalization, in this sense, is a passage from “ontological totality” to “ethical alterity,” from the said to the unsaid through the restoration of an infinite saying. The return of the infinite saying becomes the only way to bridge the gap between the said and unsaid. As Levinas says: “The otherwise than being is stated in a saying that must also be unsaid in order to thus extract the otherwise than being from the said in which it already comes to signify but a being otherwise” (*Otherwise* 8).

Being discursive, the specters of anti-globalization form *ipso facto* a spectral manifestation of language: the ghost-like signified (absent) is endlessly projected by the signifier (presence) through which an endless process of *différance* (the infinite saying) is introduced. This spectral characteristic of language makes the injustice of globalization seemingly re-presentable (i.e., presentable in/through the *différance* of language). The haunting relationship between the signifier and the signified is nevertheless not representational but ethical. This is because the phenomenon of an endlessly signifying resistance can be viewed, in Nietzsche’s phrase, an “the eternal recurrence,” the infinite inscription of globalization itself, not of the same but of difference. The politics of difference in re-making globalization is always ethical. The problem is how can specters communicate with each other with their diverse voices? What can they do or say in order to get a hearing for their demand for justice?

Critics have noticed that there is no stable and permanent center from which to
plan, organize, or conjoin the diverse anti-globalization forces. Is it possible for these disparate and desperate forces to be transformed into a powerful thanato-cathexis of resistance? I would like to approach this problem by laying bare the “gaze” of anti-globalization forces. There are, in postmodern theory, several different sorts of gazes: the male gaze in feminism, the imperial gaze in postcolonialism and the spectator’s gaze in theater and film studies. What then do I mean by the anti-globalization specter’s gaze that challenges the gaze of dominators? Derrida’s and Lacan’s descriptions of the experience of encountering a specter and Foucault’s interpretation of the panopticon are excellent supplements to my argument. In Specters of Marx, Derrida argues that “the subject that haunts is not identifiable, one cannot see, localize, fix any concrete form, one cannot decide between hallucination and perception, there are only displacements; one feels oneself looked at by what one cannot see” (136). The specter as such is an invisible omnipresent-and-omnipotent Cheshire cat grinning at the chosen subject without being seen in any tangible form. The reason why Marx’s specters, for Derrida, are not identifiable and cannot be localized or fixed in form is because they embody the invisible gaze of the Other. Nevertheless, Derrida does not explain how the invisible feeling of being gazed at operates, or, more precisely, he does not take into account that the “gazed” is sometimes not an object but a subject.

“What is the gaze?” (Lacan 82). Lacan’s interpretation of encountering the gaze of the Other as illusion gives us an insight into the ghostly object-subject relation between the gazer and the gazed. “I see myself seeing myself. The privilege of the subject seems to be established here from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations belong to me” (81). In other words, Lacan believes that if the eye of the other is that which observes us and we are fully aware of the fact that we are being observed, then the real gaze of the other is the internalized return of that observation—“my representations belong to me.” This inner, reflexive effect of our awareness of being gazed at by the Other shows us how we are caught by our own imagined gaze. That is why Lacan asserts that the gaze I encounter is “not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other” (84). To dig down to the deeper layers of the commanding language of anti-globalization as “gazing,” we need to explain to what extent this self-projected gaze can command us. One of the clearest instances of an imagined gaze in the field of the Other or of the invisible gaze of the specter can be found in Foucault’s analysis of “the panopticon” in Discipline and Punish.
The panopticon designed by Jeremy Bentham (1784-1832) is a piece of architecture based on the idea that every person is isolated in his/her own small room, but they all are observed at all times by a single watcher in the central tower. The building would be lit around the perimeter, so that each person could be clearly seen by the central observer, who could watch any inmate in the “panopticon” without being seen. Since each inmate would see neither the observer nor any other inmate, every person would “discipline” himself/herself for he/she would always feel as though he/she were being watched by the observer (his own internalized observer) (Foucault, *Discipline* 195-230). Bentham envisions the same basic concept not only for prisons but also for factories, schools, barracks, hospitals and asylums. For Foucault, “panoptism was a technological invention in the order of power, comparable with the steam engine in the order of production. This invention had the peculiarity of being utilized first of all on a local level, in schools, barracks and hospitals” (*Power/Knowledge* 71). The innovations of disciplinary power, as Foucault points out, are all brought together in a single architectural innovation which attempts to create a docile body or, to use Anthony Burgess’s metaphor, a “Clockwork Orange” and make it possible “to bring the effects of power to the most minute and distant elements” (*Discipline* 216). Such Foucauldian micro-power effects of the inward eye or internalized monitor (panopticon) remind us of Derrida’s “one feels oneself looked at by what one cannot see” and Lacan’s “a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other.”

Here I have no intention of repeating the Foucauldian thesis that “the gaze that sees is a gaze that dominates” (*Clinic* 39). What I will attempt to do is to tease out the “gaze” of the anti-globalization forces: the eye of the anti-globalization specter is certainly not a panoptical eye asserting its repressive and disciplinary power. It does not enforce any ideological “body snatching” of “interpellation” which “hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (Althusser 162) in order to serve the interests of the ruling classes. On the contrary, it features an ethico-political urge “to look back,” to call for justice or even for revenge and, surely, for dissent from the Machiavellian politics of globalization. The specter’s gaze as part of the language of anti-globalization signifies the uncompromising position of the Other.

Levinas describes the gaze of the Other: “He [the Other] comes to join me. But he joins me to himself for service; he commands me as a Master. This command can concern me only inasmuch as I am a master myself; consequently this command commands me to command” (*Totality* 213). The specter looks at us and sees us while at the same time seeing what we cannot see—the exchange of gaze is not available to
us. Accordingly, this radical asymmetry of the spectral gaze “interrupts here all specularity” (Derrida, *Specters 6*). Derrida names this the *visor-effect* of spectrality, which ruptures our notion of a spatio-temporal homogeneity by a look that is outside our space and time. This specter looks at us, “we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority [...] and asymmetry, according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion. Here anachrony makes the law” (Derrida, *Specters 7*). Those who do not see and cannot tell who it is are subject to its haunting and gazing power, and submit to this specter of the Other.

**III. Deconstructing Globalization**

Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructable. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice.

—Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law”

After Seattle, many scholars from different disciplines started to examine the current process of globalization seriously and critically. The most debatable questions include: what is globalization, who rules it, to what ends, by what means, and in whose interests? We must admit that what globalization really needs, in the process of examining its injustices, is serious critique and sincere self-reflexivity. In truth, among the urgent calls to deconstruct the imperial code of globalization, many anti-globalizers are attempting to promote acts of resistance using practical, affirmative and constructive methods. Recent books such as *Globalization from Below: The Power of Solidarity* (2000), *Globalization/Anti-Globalization* (2002), *Alternatives to Economic Globalization* (2002), and *People before Profit: The New Globalization in an Age of Terror, Big Money, and Economic Crisis* (2003) all show us the optimistic attitude and vigorous energy required to welcome the anti-globalization specters with a Levinasian “hospitality”—“a hospitality that comes to take on a much more radical value than it does in the Kant of *Toward Perpetual Peace* and of the cosmopolitical right to universal hospitality—yes, *cosmopolitical*, which is to say, only political and juridical,
civil and state (always determined by citizenship)” (Derrida, *Adieu* 68). Furthermore, these books all try to offer salutary and practical ways to reform the recent free-market-oriented mode of globalization.

Take Jeremy Brecher, Tim Costello, and Brendan Smith’s *Globalization from Below* for instance. Its authors deem that the very root of problems lies in the fact that globalization enacts a top-down force. Although the current process of globalization is still dominated by a few wealthy countries, these writers optimistically believe that there is a counter-movement—a movement to re-shape globalization from “below.” Specifically, by bringing together grassroots struggles under the umbrella of anti-globalization, they call for a globalization movement practically structured by human values, one “less dominated by the culture and values of global capital, even if it is still constrained by them” (122). They also offer us practical and detailed methods to reduce poverty, limit environmental damage and enhance democratic regulation of the economy.

Similarly, Charles Derber, in *People before Profit*, believes that we must rewrite the rules of globalization in order to pursue a more democratic global community, which, he argues, as do Brecher, Costello and Smith, has to begin at the grassroots level—people before profit, planet before special interests and justice before greed. The problem is: would people automatically put justice before profit? Or, how can we convince them that justice “in the bush” is more urgent and significant than profit “in the hand”? To answer these thorny questions, we need to shift back to a theoretical scrutiny of the relationship between specter, time and justice. I would begin with the questions: what are the features of the specter’s time? Does the specter dwell in a human temporal dimension? Briefly, time, for the Derridean specters, is not a scientific time (Aristotelian time): the present is as an instant punctually moving from the Birth of Time (the Big Bang of big bangs) towards the Death of Time (the Black Hole of black holes). Nor is it the Heideggerian time: the present is part of the self-constituting production of a particular kind of being, rather than a mere given form; thus, “Dasein must also be called ‘temporal’ in the sense of Being ‘in time’” (*Being* 429). The specter’s time rather implies a messianic time (Levinasian time): a messianic time which is a time without clock, without “Being-towards-the-end” and without a Messiah; a time which is against the closure of death and a time which is always “not yet.”

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas argues that “[t]ime is precisely the fact that the whole existence of the moral being—exposed to violence—is not being for death, but
the ‘not yet’ which is a way against death, a retreat before death in the very midst of its inexorable approach” (224). A messianic time, being always “not yet,” as Derrida always reminds his reader in *Specters of Marx*, is a time “out-of-joint.” It is off its hinges, thereby kept open and suspended so that the specters may join in. Based on this notion of time, Derrida aligns his spectrality of textual-linguistic deconstruction with an ethico-political (post)deconstructive messianism—*justice* (along with the notions of democracy, ethics, friendship and politics in his recent ethico-political articles and books): “Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructable. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists. Deconstruction is justice” (“Force” 14-15). Justice, the only thing he believes undeconstructable, is a forever-coming messianic otherness—“the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the *arrivant as justice*” (*Specters* 28).

Here, if ontological time is the “full-comprehension” and all-encompassing state of Being, then spectral time is the relentless disturbance (or, rather the very impossibility) of ontological time, the infinite resistance to the totality of the present.

Let us now see how Derrida further relates justice to spectral temporality in *Specters of Marx*. No justice is possible, as Derrida believes, without the “responsibility” for that which is “beyond all living present” or the non-contemporaneity of the living present. Justice is never (self-)present—it is to live for what is *not-yet* and is *no-longer*. Instead of referring to self-possessed moments of modalized presents, i.e., the past-present, present-present and future-present, Derrida proposes our link to instants that are always unfulfilled, out-of-joint, yet-to-be (xix-xx). A spectral time is not a linear time. It is always disjointed, something that has gone wrong in the linear time.

It is in the very nature of this *disjuncture* as a separation in time, justice and the I-Other relation that we can understand better the spectrality of anti-globalization. We follow Derrida as he reads Heidegger’s reading of the “Anaximander fragment”: Derrida points out that Heidegger tries to create an alternative notion of justice, a notion of justice beyond right—*Dike* (justice, droit, trial penalty or punishment, vengeance). Heidegger says that *Dike* also refers to such notions as adjoining, adjustment, and articulation of the accord. As far as a presence is adequate to itself, *Dike* conjoins the joint and the accord harmoniously. That is, Heidegger attempts to associate an alternative notion of justice with jointure. His notion of justice therefore remains bound to the ontological totality of Being. On the contrary, *Adikia* is what is disjointed, off-course. Heidegger reads this as a reference to the condition of the
present itself. For if the present were homogeneous it could have no junctures, no possibility of anything being out-of-joint. Adikia then must refer to time itself, as non-contemporaneity, untimeliness and anachronicity. Heidegger characterizes the present as what lingers between that which comes and that which leaves, while Derrida sees the present as being at the articulation between what absents itself and what presents itself: an in-between, an articulation which conjoins a double-articulation: “Presence is enjoined, ordered, distributed in the two directions of absence, at the articulation of what is no longer and what is not yet. To join and enjoin. This thinking of the juncture is also a thinking of injunction” (Specters 25).

The present is a command, but also a plea that holds together the disparate. Heidegger argues that the Adikia is necessary, but Dike must be given—not as restitution, expiation or calculation, but freely, by liberating the gift from the horizon of vengeance and punishment. If giving is not to fill a lack or to satisfy a need, what does it mean to give? One is oneself disjointed in a dislocated present. How to give Dike when one does not have it? Heidegger’s reply is that one gives over-and-above the commerce of exchange, as a supplement: the leaving to the other what properly belongs to him. The gift, according to this formulation, is a not-taking as a giving.

Yet as Derrida recognizes, Heidegger, by regarding the gift as a leaving, is defining the other as a self-presence; Dike is his property. If justice is the gift as leaving-be to the other what is of the other, it is as juncture of the accord. An ultimate gathering-together of the disparate in the name of the other gives presence to Being. Derrida echoes Levinas:

Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still more beyond moralism, does not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible excess of a disjointure or an anachrony, some Un-Fuge, some “out of joint” dislocation in Being and in time itself, [...] always risking [...] injustice (adikia) against which there is no calculable insurance, [that] would alone be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as other? (Specters 27)

To this perhaps we may add: the disjuncture, which is the relation to the infinite-other, is the condition for all justice regarding the concrete production of the Other, namely, disjoint others. John D. Caputo claims that “[h]ere [in Specters of Marx] Derrida pursues the impish paradox that justice lies in dis-joining, disad-justment, a
point he pursues by way of a cross-reading of Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* with Karl Marx, which is itself a peculiar conjoining of the disjoint” (153). Disadjustment is the condition for justice. Disjuncture is the very time of spectrality. As a result, spectrality signifies not only the questioning of binary oppositions between presence and absence, between “real time” and “deferred time,” but also the *very undoing* of such oppositions (Derrida, *Specters* 39). In an interview with Richard Kearney, Levinas attempts to show how, for a being, ethics (the relation to the Other) is ultimately prior to his relation to himself (ontology as egology). However, this does not mean that the ego meets the Other before entering into the political situation of sociality but that ethics is always “haunting.” I and the Other, Levinas explains, are related as *time*, as

an untotizable diachrony in which one moment pursues another without ever being able to retrieve it, to catch up with, or coincide with it. The non-simultaneous and non-present are my primary rapport with the other in time. Time means that the other is forever beyond me, irreducible to the synchrony of the same. (Kearney and Levinas 21)

Nevertheless, there are always more than two persons in the world. If there were only two, says Levinas, laws and regulations would have been unnecessary as “I” would always be accountable for the other. When what Levinas names the “third party” enters the scene the primordial ethical relation is immediately reduced to the political power relation, and an economy of violence is generated. Perhaps we may argue that globalization, with its recent changes in/to the world economy and culture increasingly involving an intensification in the scale and density of global flows, has failed to recognize this ethical relation with the third party. And that is why ethics as

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8 The interview is entitled “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas” and included in *Face to Face with Levinas*. Here Levinas sees the “interhuman” as an “interface,” a double-axis that juxtaposes what is “of the world” *qua* phenomenological intelligibility with what is “not of the world” *qua* ethical responsibility (20). This notion is pivotal in understanding the “spectropolitics” that Derrida presents in *Specters of Marx*.

9 “Third party” means “another other” or “other others” between the I and the Other. In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas’s face-to-face relation concentrates solely on the encounter between the Self and the Other. Therefore Derrida points out that Levinas needs to provide us with “some account of how, without universalization, the encounter with the Other can be at the foundation of a moral society” (Davis 52). Therefore, to answer Derrida’s question, Levinas introduces the notion of the “third party” in *Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence*. Levinas writes: “This ‘thirdness’ is different from that of the third man, it is the third party that interrupts the face to face of a welcome of the other man, interrupts the proximity or approach of the neighbour; it is the third man with which justice begins” (150).
the voice of the repressed must return and re-return as a specter, enacting interrogative interruptions of a too-complacent politics. It returns also as a disrupting temporality, an à-venir (to come), which Derrida distinguishes from the “future” that can actively produce the ethico-political present as the possibility of justice. “Justice remains, is yet to come, à-venir, it has an, it is à-venir, the very dimension of events irreducibly to come. [...] Perhaps it is for this reason that justice, insofar as it is not only a juridical or political concept, opens up for l’avenir, the transformation, the recasting or refounding of law and politics” (Derrida, “Force” 27). In term of spectral time, justice is thus never self-present but always to come as an à-venir in the logic of différance.

Each ethico-political protest of the anti-globalization movements (such as those seen in Seattle, Prague, or Genoa) then can be understood as repeating itself in différance according to the logic of hauntology. In fact, where there is a consolidation of a globalizing force, there is a haunting spectrality taking place somewhere as a repetition of différance. Gilles Deleuze’s ideas of “difference and repetition” and “desiring machine” are helpful for us to further explore the singularity of the anti-globalizing spectrality. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze provides us with an immanent analysis of a Nietzschean model of ontology in which the “difference” is related to the difference through difference itself in each event. The differentiator differentiates itself, while repetitions repeat themselves in the sense of eternal returns: “The repetition in the eternal return excludes both the becoming-equal or the becoming-similar in the concept, and being conditioned by lack of such a becoming” (115). The iterability, alterity, singularity and undecidability of an event in the force or process of anti-globalization creates not only a global “phenomenon” in itself but also implies the undeconstructible mystery of its irreducible Other.

In fact, the spectrality of anti-globalization might be seen as the other side of what Deleuze and Felix Guattari call the “flow-producing machine” of (“schizophrenic”) capitalism, connected to a “flow-interrupting machine” which draws off part of the first flow.10 The spectral thrust of anti-globalization then produces an infinite flow in/of difference and repetition. In the ethico-political process of deconstructing globalization, the specter’s time urges a messianic justice with no Messiah.

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10 This flow-producing desire streams from an unconscious machine, which is productive like an acting factory, rather than from a Lacanian linguistic unconscious which is like a passive, an lack-motivated theatre. Deleuze and Guattari write: “the psychoanalyst becomes a director for a private theater, rather than the engineer or mechanic who sets up units of production, and grapples with collective agents of production and anti-production” (55).
Conclusion

Transgression does not deny the taboo but transcends and completes it.
—Georges Bataille, *Eroticism*

The ethical resistance is the presence of infinity.
—Emmanuel Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*

In his “Letter on Humanism,” Heidegger criticizes Sartre’s existentialist tenet: existence precedes essence. He argues that Sartre, reversing the traditional metaphysical *essential/existential* hierarchy in place since Plato’s time, remains trapped in the mire of metaphysics. That is to say, Sartre’s view of the free will to act remains rooted in Cartesian subjectivity and humanism—it is a new humanism that tries to pave a third way between the two leading competitive humanisms of the time, those of Christianity and communism:

To that extent the thinking in *Being and Time* is against humanism. But this opposition does not mean that such thinking aligns itself against the human and advocates the inhuman, that it promotes the inhumane and deprecates the dignity of man. Humanism is opposed because it does not set the *humanitas* of man high enough. (Heidegger, “Letter” 233-34)

Likewise, although relentlessly resisting globalization, the forces of anti-globalization do not stand in complete opposition to it. The anti-globalization movement has shown the world the semiotic energy of a never-absolute, never-present dispersion of *différance* through which it will constantly deconstruct the symbolic mode of globalization. The specters of anti-globalization inexorably haunt (1) “big business”: the late-capitalist corporate power structure; (2) “big money”: the consensus of neoliberalism on the global growth of the economy; and (3) “big damage”: placing capital profit before the environment. Anti-globalization as such should not be seen as projecting annihilating forces against our existing civilization, but as introducing affirmative forces to prevent globalization from going awry.

To conclude, in the I-Other relation, when the Self encounters the specters of the
Other, there is no easy way to exorcise them. Neo-liberal globalization must first show its willingness to maintain an ethical relation to its specters, admitting that it has done too little to help the world’s poor and protect the world’s ecology. What’s more, it must resolve to take responsibility for, and action to improve, the present global situation in time and for justice in the economy of repetition and difference. Having examined the spectral dynamics of anti-globalizing forces, we are better able to discern that the hidden meaning of anti-globalization is structured by the specter’s time (as justice) and oriented by the specter’s language (as gaze). Persistently bringing the excluded others into focus, these anti-globalizing, hauntological forces or “phenomena” bring to the fore for us a Levinasian belief: “The ethical resistance is the presence of infinity” (Collected 55).

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